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The objective of this thesis is to address the idea of
implementing a viable T&E technique at the early stages of
DT&E in order to reduce design discrepancies and minimize
acquisition costs and time. This technique involves inte-
gration of Task Analysis, Operator Interviews and Link
Analysis to evaluate a system's Functional Mock-up. The
technique will, therefore, be referred to as Integration
Analysis throughout the paper. In order to provide a measure
of its contribution, it will be implemented on a recently
procurred system that experienced numerous HFE design
discrepancies at its OT&E stage. The system in question,
the Recovery Assist, Securing, and Traversing (RAST) System
associated with the LAMPS MK III Acquisition, revealed
HFE problems in relation to its LSO Control Station. The
use of the subject technique could have discovered a majority
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I. INTRODUCTION
The overall effectiveness of a military system lies in
the ability of the human to operate, maintain, and. support
the system's equipment. If the human element is not afforded
the same amount of consideration as. the hardware/software
components of the system, the advances achieved in present
day technology may never be totally realized. This under-
standing has created a greater concern for Human Factors
Engineering (HFE) and its potential for improving the end
product in system design.
A major catalyst for such concern has been shipboard
air operations. Air operations include aircraft launch
and recovery, flight control, and close aboard helicopter
unique tasks such as vertical replenishment. The reasoning
behind the requirement for HEE applications in air operations
is that these operations generally include systems which:
1. Are highly complex and sophisticated and, therefore,
difficult to operate and maintain
2. Require a high degree of interaction and coordination
among operators
3. Require extensive human judgement and decision making
4-. Comprise operations which are critical to the safety
of aircrew and ship's personnel
5. Include sequences of operations which are highly
time constrained and time critical. { Ref . 1}
8

Such considerations have increased efforts to apply HFE
technology during the Systems Acquisition Process. The
development of a HFE Test and Evaluation Program has helped
to structure these efforts and produce more efficient systems.
MIL-H-4.6855B (Human Engineering Requirements for Military
Systems, Equipment and Facilities) requires that a T&E Program
be integrated into engineering design tests, contractor
demonstrations, and Research and Development acceptance tests.
Generally, the purposes of such a program are:
1
.
To assure fulfillment of applicable requirements
2. To demonstrate conformance of system, equipment and
facility design to human engineering design criteria
3. To confirm compliance with performance requirements
where man is a major system performance determinant
4.. To secure quantitative measures of system performance
which are a function of man-machine interactions
5. To determine whether undesirable design or procedural
features have been introduced. { Ref . 2}
The implementation of the HFE Test and Evaluation concept
into the Naval System Acquisition Cycle has, therefore,
afforded the opportunity to validate system design throughout
the entire Cycle.
The separation of the Cycle into a number of stages,
including conceptual, validation, full scale development, and
production/deployment lends itself to a series of check
points during the system's acquisition process. At the

conclusion of each stage, the Defense System Acquisition Review
Council (DSARC) assesses the achievement of the appropriate
milestones. Each succesive Review demands more stringent
standards in relation to HFE design, thus, increasing the
requirements for Test and Evaluation. { Ref . 4. }
In order to adequately cover the different stages of the
Acquisition Cycle, T&E has been separated into two types,
Devalopment Test and Evaluation (DT&E) and Operational Test
and Evaluation (OT&S). The process over the stages of the
Acquisition Cycle is depicted in Figure 1 . DT&E emphasizes
the technological and engineering aspects of the system and
is normally carried out under controlled conditions. OT&E
includes all efforts in relation to obtaining operational
information from prototype development through the system's
life cycle. As a result, the T&E process follows the system
from the completion of DSARC I and continues throughout its
life. { Ref. 3 }
During DT&E the developing agency is responsible for
conducting tests to verify system performance and solve
technical problems. Basically, it must establish that the
system meets performance requirements and objectives. It
must, also, be operable, reliable, supportable, maintainable
and have acceptable engineering. {Ref. 2 }
Prior to DSARC II, DT&E is concerned with identifying
critical questions, issues, and possible deficiencies. After
DSARC II it concentrates on identifying deficiencies and
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ready for production. After DSARC III, DT&E is relegated to
validating the fact that deficiencies identified in OT&E have
been corrected.
OT&E is divided into two types: Initial and Follow-on.
Initial CT&E is accomplished prior to production (DSARC III).
It uses information from DT&E testing and conducts its tests
using prototypes or pilot production systems to determine
operational effectiveness and suitability. Follow-on OT&E is
conducted after the production decision and by fleet operational
personnel
.
In addition to the usage of controlled conditions for
DT&E versus operational conditions for OT&E, there are other
dimensions that make them different. Both DT&E and OT&E
attempt to identify HFE discrepancies during their respective
processes, however DT&E is initiated earlier in the Cycle
and, therefore, may affect the number of deficiencies detected
in OT&E.
Each system has various representations that are evaluated





3. Non- functional mockups
U. Functional mockups
5. Production Prototypes
6. Pilot Production items
7. Full Production items
While DT&E is applicable to any representation of a system,
OT&E apolies to only the last three. { Ref . 2 }
12

Another difference is in terras of the operators. DT&E
data are usually obtained -by the evaluators or by test subjects
selected to rspresent the actual users. OT&E uses personnel
that will be eventual operators in the fleet.
Earlier initialization and a greater variety of system
representation suggest that DT&E lends itself to a broader
scope of T&E techniques during the Acquisition Process.
Each additional system representation offers an additional
opportunity to evaluate various aspects of the system by
utilization of various techniques. The number of different
techniques utilized is directly related to the expediency at
which DT&E is organized and implemented into the Cycle. Once
into the Cycle, -the wide range of T&E approaches used in DT&E
provides an opportunity to discover discrepancies early on,
and therefor'-., enables a smoother OT&E process once it enters
into the C;/c. e.
The application of a particular T&E technique in DT&E
depends on the phase of the Acquisition Process involved.
Each Phase requires the completion of certain milestones, or
objectives, before the next Phase can be started, as depicted
in Figure 2.. The formal introduction of DT&E occurs after
DSARC I. { Ref. k }
As the process continues, the system matures as do the
T&E and DSARC requirements. It is important to realize that
even though a system completes a milestone, the elements
involved in that achievement are not considered finalized.
13

1. Approval >t MENS
A. Requirements F.iise
- Is a new system needed?
- What does it need to do?
- Identifies Operational Conditions
- Identifies Lnviroimcntal Conditions
- Analyzes Similar Systems
- Milestone
B. Conceptual Phase
- Selection of alternatives
- Can the '.eq:iiterai;nts be met?
- Kequi;- .ments Analysis
- Functi n Allocation
- Manning Analysis
- Position Descriptions
- Ta^k Aialysis/S imu la t ions
-DSARC I- Milestone I
C. Validation •' Dew jnstra tion) Phase
- Workspace l.jyout In response to communication, control, display
and nia^-comput er/machine requirements
- Maintenance- Roles & Responsibilities
- Job Performance Aids
- Training- Skill/knowledge Requirements
- Media
- Personnel
- DSARC il- .Mlestone II
D. Full Scale Deveiopmen C Phase




- Prototype Lval: DTfcE/OT&E
- Critical. Design Keviews
- Pilot Test of Training Program
- Maintenance Procedures
- Operational Procedures
- DSARC III- Milestone III
E. Product ion/ Deployment Phase
- Modifications
- Safety
Figure 2. HFE S System Acquistion Cycle
U

As the System develops, operational procedures, new technology,"*
or newly discovered design discrepancies may force engineering
changes or re-evaluation of the analyses conducted in the
Conceptual Phase. This causes a hold up in the Process until
the system is re-evaluated using the modified version. Such
a looping effect results in time delays and cost overruns.
Granted, new technology and changes in tactical doctrine
should be implemented if feasible, but redesigns, especially
well into the Cycle, can and should be minimizec Therefore,
the early introduction of T&E into the Cycle is imperative.
The completion of the system's Task Analysis provides an
opportunity for initiation of techniques to identify HFE design
deficiencies. The Task Analysis is quite adaptable to the
various testing approaches available to DT&E. In combination
with system Mock-ups or rrodels, adequate operational scenerios
can be developed and evaluated with respect to HFS design.
Such evaluations can be repeated inexpensively throughout
the acquisition cycle to analyze changes in operational
procedures or new technology. Most importantly, the early
appearance of DT&E in the Acquisition Cycle provides an advanced
opportunity to discover design discrepancies on a maturing
yet viable system.
The objective of this thesis is to address the idea of
implementing a viable T&E technique at the early stages of
DT&E in order to reduce design discrepancies and minimise
acquisition costs and time. This technique involves integration
15

of Task Analysis, Operator Interviews and Link Analysis to
evaluate a. system's Functional Mock-up. The technique will,
therefore, be referred to as Integration Analysis throughout
the paper. In order to provide a measure of its contribution,
it will be implemented on a recently procurred system that
experienced numerous HFE design discrepancies at its OT&E
stage. The system in question, the Recovery Assist, Securing,
and Traversing (RAST) System associated with the LAMPS MK III
Acquisition, revealed HFE problems in relation to its LSO
Control Station. The use of the subject technique could have




1 ! * GENERAL APPROACH
A. FORMAL INTEGRATION
The formal integration of DT&E into the System Acquisition
Process implies an advanced version of the Task Analysis for
the subject system. In order to set HFE T&E off to an expedi-
tious and comprehensive start, the availability of the Task
Analysis offers an immediate evaluation technique.
The detailed steps of the Task Analysis makes it possible
to conduct a Link Analysis of the system's various operational
scenerios. The information obtained from the Link Analysis
may point out RES design problems encountered during the
course of the system's task sequence. The Task Analysis can
also be used to create the system's operation on a Functional
Mock-up. Any problems experienced by the Mock-up's operators
during the performance of their tasks may reveal HFE discrep-
ancies. When the results of the Link Analysis and the Operato]
Interviews are combined for comparison and verification, the
HFE T&E process will have been given an early, relatively
inexpensive, and substantial boost.
B. GENERAL APPROACH
The general approach to this evaluation procedure includes
the following steps;
1 . Participation in the development of the Task Analysis
to ensure adequate details are included for use in T&E,
17

2. Incorporate the Task Analysis into the development
and operation of a Functional Mock-up.
3. Perforin a Link Analysis by following each operational
scenerio in the Task Analysis.
L. Evaluate the Link Analysis results with respect to
sub-optimal HFE.
5. Interview the operators of the Mock-up with a well
structured procedure for extracting both obvious and
underlying HFS problems.
6. Compare the Link Analysis with the Interviews to
correlate discovered discrepancies.
A Task Analysis is a study that develops a sequence of
tasks necessary to accomplish each function allocated to man
{Ref. 5 } • It determines information and control requirements,
skill and knowledge requirements, possible errors associated
with each task and their implications, workloads, and scheduling
(simultaneous or individual task execution) {Ref. 6}. The
evaluator's involvement in the completion of the Task Analysis
ensures that these necessary details are included, and
sufficiently covered. A simple sequential listing of the tasks
doesn't provide the necessary information to ascertain if a
particular task can be performed adequately, if at all.
With a comprehensive Task Analysis in hand, the operation
of the system on a Functional Mock-up can be conducted in
controlled, but adequately realistic conditions. The controlled
environment actually affords, the operators a greater opportunity
18

to fully judge if each task can be completed according to the
information and. control requirements stipulated by the Task
Analysis
.
Link Analysis is a technique whieh provides information
needed to produce an acceptable arrangement of men and machines
in a system {Ref. 6} . Before a link analysis can be performed,
firm decisions must be made about the fjxact items of equipment
to be used, the number of men who will operate them, and the
functions that will be performed {Ref. 5). The rationale
behind the link analysis techniques is that the "best arrangement''
can be found only by optimizing different types of links that
are important in the particular system being designed. A
link is a connection between (a) an operator and a machine or
(b) two operators. The links may be visual (such as an
instrument scan), functional (hand to control), or verbal.
Inefficiencies occur when links are compara tively long, crossing
one another, blocked, or outside optimal visual or reach
envelopes. The links produced from the Task Analysis illustrate
all the operator required functional, visual, and communication
tasks. The Link Analysis can be applied to all scenerios
involved during all operational and emergency conditions.
{ Ref. 5 and 6} .
Since the Link Analysis depicts every requirement and the
possible restrictions in their attainment, the Link Analysis
may reveal problems that could be unconsciously compensated
for by the operator during the Mock-up operation. By conducting
19

the Link Analysis evaluation before the Operator Interviews,
these compensation areas could be addressed in the interview
in order to access their degree of importance.
The Operator Interviews are sectioned ir.to two types of
questions: general and specific. The interview begins with
general questions to determine whether any performance problems
have been noted by the operator. More specific questions
follow to cover the range of equipment/ job variables that











It is assumed that if the System test consists of several
operations or cycles, the operator will be interviewed following
each such operation cycle. {Ref . 7 }
The final step in this integrated HFE evaluation technique
involves the compilation of all the information obtained through
the link analysis and the interviews. This comparison step can
help verify discrepancies and provide a means for selecting
correction priorities for each discrepancy. Further, it may
be possible to discover other problems when the two techniques
20

are combined and analyzed. What appears to be satisfactory-
evaluations for the individual techniques, may reveal underlying
problems when all the information is integrated.
C. PRACTICAL APPLICATION
A practical application of this formal integration of Task
Analysis, Link Analysis, and Operator Interviews on a Functional
Mock-up was implemented on the RAST System. It concentrated
on the System's primary operating area, the Landing Safety
Officer (LSO) Control Station. Even though the System is near
its completion in the Acquisition Process, the comparison of
this technique's contribution to HFE T&E when applied during
the System's early development and the actual multiple HFE
discrepancies discovered during the System's advanced stages
give a direct measure of its worth in relation to redesign
costs and Acquisition Process time delays.
D. RAST SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
The RAST System was developed in an attempt to increase
safety during helicopter launch, recovery, and deck traversing
on single landing area air-capable ships such as Frigates and
Destroyers. It is being implemented on the Oliver H. Perry
Class Frigates (FFG-7) and the Spruance Class Destroyers
(DD 963). In conjunction with the LAMPS MK III development,
one system was installed on the USS Mclnery (FFG-8) for System
Acquisition evaluation. { Ref . 8 }
The RAST System is designed to support the landing,
launching, and handling of helicopters during sea conditions
21

of up to sea state five. The System has four major operational
segments
:




4.. Maneuvering and Straightening the Helo for alignment
with the track
Control of the EAST System is accomplished by the LSO located
at a control console within a rigidly constructed enclosure
that protrudes above the flight deck as depicted in figure 3.
The LSO ' s responsibility for visual inspections of the heli-
copter during operations necessitates the station's cloL: e
proximity to the landing-launch area. {Ref. 8}
A typical operating cycle of the EAST system includes:
traversing the helicopter along a track from the hanger aft
to the launch area; helicopter launch; hook-up of the heli-
copter with the hauldown cable; hauldown and securing of the
helicopter; alignment of the helicopter with the track; and
traversing the helo forward into the hanger. The LSO must
be fitted with the controls, displays, and communications
equipment necessary for the safe and efficient conduct of
the operation's cycle.
In detail, the Recovery Assist Mission is as follows;
As the helicopter approaches, a messenger cable is deployed





cable is attached to the messenger cable and winched up by the
aircraft. After the cable end fitting is locked into the
aircraft's main probe, the pilot selects the appropriate power
setting to maintain hover over the ship's flight deck. The
cable, tensioned with 4., 000 pounds pull, is controlled by the
LSO who operates the RAST console on deck. The LSO waits for
a trough in the swells, signals the pilot, and through their
quick and coordinated action, the tensioned cable assists the
helicopter to land safely. The main probe engages an arresting
device, called the Rapid Securing Device (RSD), which secures
the helicopter probe to the deck. The pilot then shuts the
aircraft down. {Ref . 9
}
The basic plan for the system presently installed on the
USS Mclnery used the Canadian Beartrap configuration 33 ar
initial guideline. The placement and configuration for etch
RAST subsystem was determined with the help of land t£.sed
mock-ups of the ship's flight deck and RAST control rooms,
The prototype was then installed on the Mclnery for at-sea
evaluations in conjunction with the LAMPS MK III program.
During the LAMPS MK III TSCHEVAL in 1981, the LSO ' s Control
Station revealed a substantial amount of HFS deficiencies
{Ref. 8 and 10}. Some of the general problems encountered
include
:
1. Restricted fields of vision.
2. Controls, displays, and communication equipment not
optimally placed.
3. Inadequate exterior and interior lighting.
4. Complex control manipulation.
24-

After the at-sea TECHEVAL {Ref. 8}, a review of the 13
D
Station was conducted at a mock-up with the Naval Architects
of Gibbs and Cox, Inc. {Ref. 10}. The participants of the
TECHEVAL recommended design changes and modifications to the
station in order to correct identified design deficiencies
or enhance its operational suitability and human factor:-:
characteristics
.
The changes resulting from the mock-up review {Ref. 10}
and the discrepancies reported in the NATC Technical Report
RW-30R-81 {Ref. 8} greatly improved the HFE of the station,
but it still held up the Acquisition Process. A listing of
the TECHEVAL and Mock-up review discrepancies and changes
is contained in Appendix A.
The demonstrative application of the proposed Integration
Analysis will focus solely on the L30 Station installed on
the USS Mclnery and will be directly applicable only to
FFG-7 class ships. The location of the station on other
class ships, such as the DD 963' s, will be different ard
therefore have unique perspectives and constraints requiring
a separate, but procedurally equivalent analysis. It should
be realized that an attractive characteristic of Integration
Analysis is that its general methodology is an applicable
evaluation technique for any complex man-machine system.
25

III. DEVELOPING A SUITABLE TASK ANALYSIS
A. DEVELOPMENT
The ability of Integration Analysis to detect HFE discrepancies
has a great dependance on the comprehensiveness of the Task
Analysis. An inadequate attention to detail may miss seme of
the information required by an operator, exclude short but
important tasks, and/or fail to reveal the complexities of a
specific task.
A useful Task Analysis for this type of HFE T&E technique
must consider the information, control, and performance
requirements for all operational and environmental conditions.
It must, also, address performance error impact, workload;,
and scheduling effects for these conditions {Ref. 6} .
In order to produce an adequate Task Analysis, the step-
that involve the gathering and organizing of the information




Review Operational and Technical Documentation
2. Assess System/Mission Requirements





7. Work Station Design
26

These steps flow in a sequence (figure 4-) that eventually
accumulates and integrates all the information needed to
develop a comprehensive flow of the sequential tasks of a
system {Ref. 1 and 2}.
To begin, a study of the System's operation and maintenance
manuals and interviews with system designers gives one an
understanding of the capabilities and constraints of the system.
By simply knowing the basic operation of the controls and
displays, the analyst will better appreciate the complexities
of the system.
Once the System/Mission requirements are known, all the
operational and environmental conditions that could be
encountered in meeting those requirements can be identified.
The T&E process must be aware of all possible conditions,
otherwise analysis of the system may not have an opportunity
to evaluate the system's full spectrum of usage. Such
incomplete analysis may delay discrepancy detections until
the system is used in actual operations by the Fleet.
The Functional Analysis lists the functions to be carried
out to complete each Mission requirement. The analysts initial
research of the operation and maintenance manuals affords a
full understanding of each function and its associated
complexities
.
The Requirements Analysis determines the information and
performance requirements for each function under each operational
and environmental condition { Ref. 5} . To be complete, it
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Once the integration of the functions and their associated
information and procedure requirements is complete, the
allocation of certain functions to either man or machine can
be conducted. This in turn leads to a workspace design and
an opportunity to evaluate that design using the Task Analysis.
B. PRACTICAL APPLICATION
Research into the LSO Console Station's development failed
to produce a Task Analysis suitable for an application of
Integration Analysis. The best report located was a Task
Listing made for an LSO Training Program! Ref. 9). It covered
all operational scenerios and their respective emergency
procedures, but fell far short of adequately addressing
environmental conditions, error impact, and information
requirements for decision making.
By following the steps of the Task Analysis Development
Sequence (Figure i) , a comprehensive Task Analysis was produced.
The sequence was used as a checklist to be sure that all the
necessary ingredients of an adequate Task Analysis were present.
Step 1 ; It was obviously necessary to fully understand
the operation of the LSO Station before any analysis could be
conducted. Control of the RAST System is primarily conducted
at the LSO' s control console (Figure 5). Through research of
the Console's Operation and Maintenance Manual (AD-700A0-OMI-01
(Ref. 11} , review of the ship's Helo Flight Operations Bill
(Ref. 12), studying of the LSO Training Syllabus Ref. 13 , and





control and display idiosyncrasies were identified. Then the
location of each control and display in the Station, but not
on the console, was determined and their operation understood
(Figure 6).







4. Maneuvering and Straightening
The LAMPS MK III Mission is expected to be conducted in most
weather conditions (Sea State 5 or below) { Ref . 8}. Therefore,
the RAST needs to be evaluated for each of these conditions:
1 Day or Night
2. Tropical or Artie temperatures
3. Rain or Snow





The results of the Functional Analysis were basically
represented in both the Task Listing and the LSO Training
Syllabus. Therefore, the necessary inputs to the Requirements
Analysis, steps 3 and 4-» were available.
With the review of the Task Analysis Development accomplished
to this point, the information was organised and integrated into










t*. X 13 Communications System
5. Window Heat Controller
6. 1JG Communications System
7. Window Wiper Control
8. Window Wiper
9. Light for Writing Table
10. LSO Console
11. Relative Wind Indicator (Magnitude and Direction)
12. 21 MC Communication System
13. 1 MC Loudspeaker
14. Pitch Indicator
15. Roll Indicator




20. 5 MC Loudspeaker
21. X13V Communications System







LSO Station Layout on the FFG-8
(Obtained from Redesign Agency,
GIBBSSCOX INC., NEW YORK, N.I.)
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G. THE RECOVERY ASSIST TASK ANALYSIS
In order to scale this practical example down, only the
Recovery Assist segment of the RAST's operation will be
explained in detail with respect to Integration Analysis.
The Recovery operation entails the most safety related and
complex tasks. The overall results of the analysis will be
presented in the conclusions.
The Task Analysis for the Mission of Recovery Assist
(Appendix 3), was constructed using the LSO ' s Task Listing
{Ref. 9) as a guideline. By enriching the contents of the
Task Listing with the information accumulated from the research
conducted on the System, the resulting Task Analysis addressed
vital areas of concern for Integration Analysis and, in general,
HFE T&E. It should be noted that the Task Listing was also ,
produced using the development sequence discussed earlier in
this chapter, however it didn't go into sufficient detail for
our purooses.
Each task was separated into subtasks and each subtask




2. Knowledge/Information required to carry out the
subtask
3. The Control(s) involved in the subtask
4.. The Display(s) involved in the subtask
5. Possible Constraints/Malfunctions that may hinder the
conduction of the subtask
6. The impact of an error performed during the subtask
33

The actions performed during a subtask are basically the
result of the functional analysis and function allocation.
A working knowledge of the system is necessary to fully
appreciate this section.
The Knowledge/Information required to carry out each
subtask is obtained through the requirements analysis. It
is imperative that this section be as complete as possible.
The results of this section affords the basis of the Possible
Constraints encountered section. If an Information requirement
is missed, certain constraints may be overlooked and may
possibly result in an unnoticed HFS discrepancy.
The Possible Constraints section deals in both specific
and general terms. It is designed to draw attention to
various areas of interest for each subtask. For example,
Visual Obstruction can include restricted fields of vision
due to structural design, glare, direct sun, rain, snow, fog,
or perspective. Indicator Illumination describes inadequate
illumination of a display due to glare, inadequate lighting,
or electrical problems. Specifics attempt to draw attention
to control operation, displays (or lack of them), and
coordinated maneuvers that may overload the operator.
Error Impact is used to give the analyst an idea of the
severity of a constraint or the lack of information necessary




A. FRAMES OF REFERENCE
Once a comprehensive Task Analysis has been developed,
the next step in the general approach to Integration Analysis
is tha concurrent application of the Task Analysis to the
operation of the system's Functional Mock-up and the perfor-
mance of a Link Analysis. The design of the Functional
Mock-up is a result of research that uses the task analysis
to develop the crew station configuration. A practical
application of the Task Analysis to the Mock-up is, therefore,
evaluating that design and, for Integration Analysis purposes,
preparing the subjects for the operator interviews. The Link
Analysis is helping to create pertinent questions to be asked
in those interviews.
The analyst's approach to the development of the Link
Analysis depends on the system's general mode of operation.
The information generated or used throughout the system's
operation is acquired in either a) two dimensional or b)
three dimensional frames of reference. Two dimensional
examples include a Radar Console panel in the Combat Information
Center (CIC) on a ship or an operations floor plan where
various operating stations are positioned throughout a room
to provide expeditious interactions, such as CIC. All the
information associated with the Radar Console can be deoicted
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by one diagram of the panel and all the interactions of the
operators can be illustrated by an overhead view of the room's
floor plan. A three dimensional mode of operation involves
the use of links from sources external to the system's control
center. As with the RAST's Recovery Assist mission, information
vital to the system's operation involves visual and communications
links external to the station. The two dimensional depiction
of the console panel is insufficient to adequately cover the
operation's various information links. Various scales and
frames of reference need to be used in such a cost to clearly
display each link during the system's operation. Clarity and
simplicity is vital if the benefits of link analysis are to
be realized.
B. PRACTICAL APPLICATION
The Recovery Assist link analysis began with the identifica-
tion }f the external visual links of the operation. Figure 7
shows the location and lines of sight for each visual link
involved in the complete mission.
By starting out with an expanded external view the analyst
is given the "big picture" in relation to the system's operation.
This view also shows that the operation entails visual links
that require more than a single plane of reference. The
Hover/Centering and the Approach links indicate that informa-








































































A narrow field of view exists with respect to a
hovering hslo over the RSD's. Lateral positioning
of the helo could prove difficult due to the operator's
acute perspective.
2. Starboard side clearance for approach will be impossible
due to the lack of a rear window at the station.
By telescoping down to a more detailed representation of
the LSO Station, tie visual links can be better scrutinized.
Figure 8 deals with the same visual links as in Figure 7, but
the links are analyzed on a smaller scale. This results in
the links indicating possible structural obstructions. The
restrictions due to the lack of a rear window are illustrated
more dramatically at this scale. Further, the severity
assessment of the various window frane restrictions is excellent
material for the operator interviews.
The next step in the scaling down process involves analysis
of the system's central control panel, the LSO console panel.
Since the external links have been addressed, the link analysis
can be conducted on a two dimensional frame of reference as
depicted by the Console diagrams in this chapter's appendix.
This approach focuses the analyst's attention on the arrange-
ment of the displays and controls used during the Recovery
Assist mission. Relative directions of the lines of sight





analysis, but internal visual links need to be illustrated
as accurately as the manual links in order to judge optimal
display-control arrangements
.
The links are numbered to coincide with the tasks and
subtasks of the Task Analysis (Appendix C). Each subtask
contains their own combination of manual and visual interactions,
thus thfey may result in strictly manual links, strictly visual
links, or a sequential combination of manual and visual links.
The internal visual links directed to the right of the console
refer to lines of sight to the wind speed/direction, pitch,
roll, and ship heading indicators (see Figure 6 for exact
locations and arrangement).
The links are analyzed for the following discrepancies:
1. Links crossing within a task indicating inadequate
arrangements.
2. Sequences of links that cause a large manual and/or
visual envelope for a task. In this case, if the
manual links .."or a particular hand and their associated
visual links are not in a narrow envelope, the controls
and displays for that task are not close enough or
in line with each other.
3. Links that indicate excessive operator workloads.
This may result during coordinated maneuvers that
involve multiple subtasks at a certain control in a
short period of time. Performance errors become
common place in such a situation.
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4.. Long manual or internal visual links.
5. Links that go outside optimal visual or reach envelopes.
Primary displays should have envelopes of 15 degrees from
either side of the line; of sight, 35 degrees for
secondary. Control envelopes depend on workstation
design, but are in many respects similar to display
envelopes. { Ref . 5}
The first major discrepancy occurs at task 3-4- where, once
again, the visual clearance for approach is blocked by the lack
of a starboard window. The external visual check of the
deck status lights (3-4.-2) is not a vital link at this stage
of the mission so its displacement from the primary visual
envelope is not a major concern.
At task 3-6 the pace of the mission picks up. Its links
show an excellent narrow envelope, indicitive of proper dis-
play and control arrangement. But, a burdensome situation
appears at the right hand control lever. Simultaneous ten-
sion control and communication tasks could cause performance
errors. In addition, multiple checks of the Internal indica-
tors are removing the operator's attention from the primary
visual envelope, The emergency task (3-6E) appears to have
an adequate link arrangement if the deck status light check
is still considered non-vital.
The links in task 3-7 illustrate the same discrepancies
as in task 3-6. The emergency wave-off task, though, shows
that the operator could be faced with a degraded performance
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situation. Clearance restrictions, simultaneous tension
control and communication, tasks, and displaced internal in-
dicator checks could all cause an overloading situation for
the operator.
At task 3-8 the pace has slowed down a little and visual
envelopes can be widened, which allows the external visual
link to the tail probe (3-3-6) to be acceptable. The rest
of the links in this task appear satisfactory.
C. APPLICATION OF RESULTS
The various discrepancies noted in each of the three frames
of reference may be used as material for immediate T&E dis-
crepancy reporting or as material for the development of the
operator interviews. With respect to the interviews, the
link analysis discrepancies contribute specific questions to
go along with the questions addressing the range of variables
mentioned in chapter II for the particular system being evaluated
In the Recovery Assist analysis, discrepancies dealing with
perspective, frame restrictions, and operator workloads may
be unconsciously overlooked by an operator during his Func-
tional Mock-up tests and subsequently in his interviews.
Soecific questions in relation to these problems would make
the operator aware of them and as a result provide a measure





The 1978 Navy Personnel Research and Development Center
publication, "Human Factors in Operational System Testing:
A Manual of Procedures" { Ref . 7} war, the exclusive guide in
the development of the questionnaire (Appendix D). It pro-
vided the general approach and many of :he specific questions
to ensure adequate coverage of the Mock-up's HFE concerns.
The planning of its contents and ths eventual results of
the interview had to avoid a major biasing factor for this
particular practical and illustrative aoplication of Inte-
gration Analysis. All of the operators interviewed had
obtained their LSO Console Station experience during either
the OPEVAL or TECHEVAL tests of the RAST. Therefore, many
of their responses and observation:" would be much more ex-
tensive than if they had only work 3d with a Functional Mock-
up. This forced the interviewer to avoid questions pertaining
to environments or situations not possible with a mock-up
and to disregard answers that went beyond the scope of a
mock-up's capabilities.
The questionnaire development also faced an excessive
time delay from last operation to actual interview. Not
only was it impossible to interview each operator after the
completion of each individual mission, the interviewer also had
to accept, intervals up to 6 months between operation and
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In retrospect, the time delay problem offers a supportive
argument for increased use of Mock-up interviews. Such
interviews can be easily conducted after eacii operation,
minimizing the possibility of incomplete appraisals that are
probable with time delays.
B. QUESTIONNAIRE CONSTRUCTION
The problems of at-sea operation bias and time delays
necessitated a preliminary operator information section to
enable the interviewer to assess the operator's experience
(see Appendix D). In the preferred situation of conducting
interviews after each Mock-up operation, information such as
weather, time of day, physical characteristics of the operator,
and experience in that mission would be applicable.
The interview begins with all encompasing General ques-
tions to allow the respondent to focus on the most important
difficulties he experienced. Keep in mind, each interview
should be conducted after each mission. All four RAST
missions are addressed at once due to the circumstances
mentioned in Questionnaire Development..
The General questions should make the respondent consider
outstanding difficulties, personnel coordination (if applicable),
task procedures, complexities, fatigue, training, equipment
relability, and equipment availability and usage { Ref . 7} .
Such questions allow the respondent to select what he considers
the most important topics. They also help him to reflect on
difficulties that may arise for less skilled operators and,
U

thus, assess procedures and complexities of various tasks.
The General equipment questions may cause the operator to
notice unnecessary, missing, or unreliable equipment.
The Specific questions follow the General questions, but
if a General question generates a response to a Specific
area, the interviewer should logically proceed to that area.
Inflexible interviews may cause incomplete appraissals. The
first Specific area deals with Equipment Characteristics of
controls and displays. Then the Environment of the work
station is addressed to assess habitabiiity and restrictions
to performance. A logical follow-on to that is Job Aid
adequacy. Safety, Manning requirements, Training assessments,
and the ability to gather and disseminate Information required
to complete each task are then addressed. Finally, the
specific discrepancies noted through the Link Analysis are
asked. Those questions would hopefully be answered before
this final section, but are included as a double check.
C. RESULTS
There were eight operators interviewed, all with consider-
able experience, using the questionnaire in appendix C. The
following is a list of their discrepancy responses with
respect to the Recovery Assist mission. The numbers in
parentheses indicate the percentage of operators that answered
with that response. Responses listed under a Specific section
were drawn out by reference to that Specific area and would
have been otherwise overlooked.
i5

I General Question Discrepancies
(* = not mentioned in Appendix A)
1
.
Difficult communication and tension control coordina-
tion (7558)
2. Inadequate ventilation (75%)
3. (*) Port RSD obstructed by deck slope (50$)
I. (*) Perspective for centering [62%)
5. Sun in eyes when looking on horizon (50$)
6. Starboard vision needed (62$)
7. Communications bad when A/C in hover/on deck (62$)
8. Cable hard to see at night (37$)
9. Glare on console panel {15%)
10. Interior lighting inadequate ($0$)
11. (*) Hook up crew gets tangled in cable ' 50$)
12. Need NATOPS holder and grease board (62$)
13. Need a seat (100$)
II Equipment Characteristics
1. Windshield wiper controls hard to operate (100$)
2. (*) Friction lock on Tension Control needed (25$)
3. (*) Better control/display description (25$)
lr. (*) Need centering display (50$)
5. (*) Need ship speed indicator (25$)
III Environment (all mentioned in General questions).
IV Job Aids (all mentioned in General questions).
V Safety




1. (*) Two person limit in station (62$)
VII Training (adequate)
VIII Information
1. Can not see if Main Probe in R3D on landing (38$)
IX Communications (all mentioned in General questions).
X Link Analysis Inputs
1. Perspective problem (62$, yes)
2. Starboard window needed (62$)
3. (*) Frame restrictions (100$)
4.. Communication and Tension Control problem (75$)
5. Indicator placement change needed (88$)
kl

VI. COMPARISONS AND C'ONCLUoIONS
The Operator Interviews drew out numerous discrepancies
in the General question section alone. This demonstrates
the advantage of giving representative operators an opportunity
to critique the system before major construction begins.
Once the obvious problems had been revealed, the Specific
questions brought out discrepancies in the realm of unconscious
compensation
.
The five Link Analysis inputs contributed even further
to unconscious compensation. Frame restrictions and place-
ment of the wind, ship heading, and pitch and roll indicator
discrepancies were not noted through the use of the General
or Specific questions.
As assessment of the Task Analysis used in both the Link
Analysis and the Functional Mock-up operations was given
tentative approval as evidenced by the minimal amount of
discrepancies relating to procedures and information avail-
ability. The need for better A/C centering information and
main probe position indication on landing were the only
major problems.
Overall, there were 21 discrepancies noted in General
and Specific questions, plus two additional discrepancies not
noted by the operator interviews, but detected by link
analysis. Compared to the discrepancies relating to a
Recovery Assist mission in appendix A, Integration Analysis
4-8

identified all of the TECHEVAL discrepancies and most of the
Mock-up Review changes. Items 1, 2, 7, 10, and 12 of the
Mock-up review were overlooked. But, Integration Analysis
discovered the 9 additional problems that were noted in the
Questionnaire Results. The major additions included the need
for a centering display, frame restrictions, and the inability
to see the Port RSD due to deck slope.
When the analysis was conducted for all four missions,
additional discrepancies were once again noted as compared
to appendix A, but the same Mock-up review changes were
still missed. Major additions include:
1. Frames obstruct visibility for Deck operations (62$)
2. No indication of slow to fast traverse selection {50%}
The results to the analyses for the other three missions
required separate task and link analyses and categorization of
the proper responses in the interviews for the applicable
mission
.
The conclusions to the analysis are biased by the fact
that the operators had at-sea experience. In addition, many
of those operators had major inputs into appendix A, which
obviously helps to correlate the results. But, their
responses were included in this analysis only if applicable
to Functional Mock-up capabilities.
The promising aspect of this proposed technique is that
it produced additional discrepancies. The analysis is also
conducted at a relatively low cost compared to an OPEVAL or
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TECHEVAL* Further, the system has only progressed throu -
approximately 4.0$ of the Acquisition Cycle when Integration
Analysis becomes applicable as compared to about 80$ at the
TECHEVAL/OPEVAL stage. The recent trend of excessive time in
the later phases of the Acquisition Cycle is mainly due to
the numerous design changes. Integration Analysis can alleviate
this problem through its early inseption and expedite the
whole Acquisition Cycle.
Integration Analysis also offers a check of equipment
characteristics, environments, safety, training, manning, and
information acquisition well before Full Development is
scheduled. Plus, it can be used as an inexpensive, minimum
time, itterative process that can evaluate major and minor
HFS changes to a system. Although not addressed here, it
can also be used to check maintenance considerations such as
accessability, reliability, and repair procedures 1 Ref . r/ ; .
Integration Analysis is actually a formal combination of
techniques that should be used in every System Acquisition
T&E process. Its early introduction into the process and
its inherent use and refinement of critical analysis techniques
makes it a viable and important step in System Acquisition




LSO CONTROL STATION TECHEVAL DISCREPANCIES
1
.
Complexity of the maneuvering and straightening procedures
due to the multiple switching tasks required by the LSO,
his inability to see the flight deck alignment markings,
and the lack of visual feedback when maneuvering the
helicopter.
2. Inefficient design of the RSD Brake switch on the LSO
console, which required that the switch be held in the
AUTO or RELEASE position.
3. Lack of an indication at the LSO station that the aircraft
RAST main probe is captured by the RSD arresting beams.
4-. Remote location of the roll indicator in the station
which precludes continuous scanning.
5. Inappropriate longitudinal and rotational movements of
the TRAVERSE handle on the LSO control console, in
relation to aircraft orientation.
6. Absence of rearward FOV from the LSO station.
7. Constant low frequency hum in the LSO headset.
8. Inadequate night lighting of the interior of the LSO
station
.
9. undesirable crosstalk between the LSO UHF and 1JG communi-
cations circuits during simultaneous transmissions.
10. Absence of provisions for stowage of manuals and operator
checklists in the LSO station.
11. Inability of the LSO and flight deck crewman to see the
messenger cable and end fitting at night.
12. Inability of the LSO to communicate on the radio or
sound-powered phone circuits during maneuvering and
straightening due to the requirement to use both hands
to operate other controls.
51

RECOMMENDED MOCK-UP REVIEW CHANGES
1. Reposition the LSO console 4-" to the right and lower its
height 3" so it can be recessed forward.
2. Relocate all communication systems from the aft bulkhead
to the forward and port bulkheads.
3. Install a 12" X 32" window in the rear bulkhead.
4.. Group all window washer/wiper/heater controls on the
starboard bulkhead above the entrance ladder.
5. Install Grimes lights above the LSO console and in each
corner of the rear bulkhead.
6. Install a storage compartment for NATOPS/procedure note-
books and a folddown seat on the rear bulkhead.
7. Install a writing surface (plexiglass with white back-
ground) above the LSO console.
8. Reverse the pitch and roll indicators.
9. Relocate the wind direction/velocity indicator to the
forward port corner of the LSO station.
10. Reposition the crash alarm from the port bulkhead to the
forward port corner of the LSO station above the wind
direction/velocity indicator.
11. Tint the upper and aft (when incorporated) control station
windows
.
12. Incorporate an operator-adjustable volume control on the
1MC loudspeaker.
13. Incorporate noise-cancelling microphones in the control
station and eliminate the UHF/ICS crosstalk.
14-. Install an emergency escape exit.
15. Install a dual action (UHF/1JG) footswitch.
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Communications Checks- RA Cable Deployment
EVC= External Visual Check on Deck









Clear Aircraft: For Landing
EVC= External Visual Check on Deck; IVC= Internal Visual Check
EEVC= External Visual Check, Elevated
- - -= Visual Link
—
-








Hook Up RA Cable
EVC= External Visual Check on Deck
EEVC= External Visual Check, Elevated






Establish RA Cable Hover Tension
EEVO External Visual Check, Elevated
IVC= Internal Visual Check
6.1/6.7= Continuous Action














Emergency Release ofRA Cable
EVC= External Visual Check on Deck
EEVC= External Visual Check, Elevated







EVC= External Visual Check on Deck
EEVC= External Visual Check, Elevated
IVC= Internal Visual Check
7.2/7.3= Continuous Action









EVC= External Visual Check on Deck
EEVC= External Visual Check, Elevated
IVO Internal Visual Check





3.1 3.3 8.4 8.9
EVC
TASK: 3.8
Secure Helo in RSD
EVC= External Visual Check on Deck





RAST System's LSO Control Station Questionnaire
Interviewer - LT. David Carlson
PURPOSE
This questionnaire is designed to accompany interviews that
will attempt to elicit the opinions of experienced operators
concerning the Human Factors Engineering design of the LSO
Control Station. The data and comments resulting from the
interviews will be used to help reveal problem areas associated
with the stations present design.
I Operator Information
1 . Name -
2. Height -
3. Date last operated RAST -
4-. Present date -
5. How many times have you operated the RAST system daring
a) Clear weather, day
i) Traversing =
ii) Flight Ops =
b) Rain, day
i) Traversing =
ii) Flight Ops ='
c) Clear weather, night
i) Traversing =
ii) Flight Ops =
d) Rain, night
i) Traversing =
ii) Flight Ops =
69

II General Questions: Ask each question in relation to all
k missions; Traversing, Launch, Recovery, and Maneuvering
and Straightening.
1. Can you recall any problems (no matter how small)
you experienced during your operation of the RASTV
If so, what? What do you think was responsible"




2. Did you observe anyone else having problems? If so,
what? What did that person do to relieve the problem?
Comments
3. Did the test operation as a whole, or your job during
the test, take much- longer than you had expected it
to take? Do you know why? Did this extra time affect
your performance in any way?
Comments
4.. Can you think of any changes in equipment or procedures




5. Could you operate the equipment in accordance with
the procedures you had been taught? If not, did you




6. Assume that someone less skilled than you had to do
your job. Would there be anything about the equipment,
procedures, or the mission as a whole that would cause
a less skilled man difficulties?
Comments
7. Were there any characteristics of the mission, such
as equipment, procedures, technical manuals, etc.,
that made it difficult to complete your tasks? How
do you know that you
Comments
had more than your usual difficulty?
Did the equipment fail in any way to perform as it
was supposed to do (in any respect, no matter how
small)? If
reaction?





9. Is every part of the equipment necessary?
Comments
:
10. Did you experience any difficulty as a consequence o.
operating the RAST for a prolonged period of time?
Comments
III Equipment Characteristics: Ask each question in relation
to all 4 missions; Traversing, Launch, Recovery, Maneuvering
and Straightening.
1 . Were the controls difficult to operate? Any particula:
controls? Do you know why the controls are difficult
to operate? How does the difficulty show itself
(mushiness, illogical movement)? What was
of the difficulty on your performance?
Comments
;he effe
2. Were any of the controls difficult to reach? How
important are these controls? What effect does this




3. Were any of the displays (meters, indicators) diffic 1
to read? How important are these displays? Why wer





4.. Did the displays provide all the information needed
to do the job? What information was missing? Was
there too much information?
Comments
5. Were any of the displays difficult to understand?
What precisely about the displays was difficult to
understand?
Comments
6. Did you have any difficulty reading the lettering




7. Did any of the controls or displays seem unnecessary




IV Environment: Ask for each mission.
1 Was the lighting in the station inadequate at any time
for you to operate with maximum efficiency? Too little
lighting? Too much lighting (Glare)?
Comments
2. Was the station excessively noisy, improperly ventilated,
too cool, or too warm? How did this affect your
performance?
Comments
V Job Aids: Ask for each mission.
Are the manuals, checklists, and aid equipment you
need for proper performance available? Are there





VI Safety: Ask for each mission.




2. Are there any desirable safety features that have not
been included in the design of the station? What are
these features? How important are they?
Comments
3. Are there any safety hazards in the station that you
noticed? If so, what? Is all safety information
conspicuously posted?
Comments :
4.. Are all required safety equipment available and




VII iManning: Ask for each mission.
1. Could you have used more men to do the job than were
assigned to your team? If so, how many and of what
type and what skill level should they have been?
Gould you have used fewer men to do the job? If so,
which ones would you eliminate?
Comments
:
2. Was anyone on your team overloaded? Why?
Comments
VIII Training: Ask for each mission.
1 . Do you feel that the training you were given for this
job was appropriate? What do you recommend to improve
training?
Comments :





3. What items were missing from the training you received
that should be added? Did you receive enough training
to do the job?
Comments:




IX Information: Ask for each mission.
1 . Do you feel that the procedures for operating the
equipment are completely adequate? Does it reflect
what you have to do? Does it cover all contingencies?
Comments
2. Is it difficult to obtain information at any time




Communications: Ask for each mission.
1 . Did you have any difficulty in receiving or supplying
information to other personnel over ICS? UHF? If
so, what? How can these be changed?
Comments
:
2. Did the necessity to communicate interfere in any
way with your job of operating the equipment?
Comments
XI Link Analysis Inputs
1 . Did you encounter a perspective problem while trying
to place the A/C over the RSD? If so, in what direc-
tion^)? How did you correct for it?
Comments
2. Did you feel that the lack of a starboard window




Did you encounter difficulties in visual obstructions




k. Did sumultaneous tension control and communication
tasks degrade your performance? If so, how? How
did you compensate?
Comments
Are the wind speed, velocity, pitch and roll, and
ship heading indicators adequately located? If not,
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